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Court Ordered Cesarean Sections: Why Courts Should Not Be
Allowed to Use a Balancing Test
“MacDuff was from his mother’s womb, Untimely ripped.” ~ MacBeth, Act V,
Scene vii

ERIN P. DAVENPORT*
ABSTRACT
Many women nowadays give birth via cesarean section, and most of the time, both
the doctors and the women are in agreement regarding the use of this procedure. Some
women, however, refuse to undergo this procedure, and their doctors may try to obtain a
court order to perform a cesarean section. This Article advances the argument that
courts should not use a balancing test when determining whether a woman should be
compelled to undergo a cesarean section. This argument is based on the right to privacy,
which arises from abortion cases and informed consent situations, and on the common
law idea that a person usually has no duty to rescue another. It analyzes the compelling
interests and considerations presented by the state when it seeks court-ordered treatment
and considers four cases that have addressed the issue of court-ordered cesarean sections.
Although these situations are difficult to resolve and often occur in time-strapped
situations, women should be allowed to make their own decisions regarding the delivery
of their children. Additionally, discussions regarding various delivery options should
occur sooner rather than later in the pregnancy to avoid situations in which the women
and their doctors transform from a cooperative team to battling adversaries.
I. INTRODUCTION
A person enters a burning building and must choose between saving a
family member or a complete stranger. Most people would likely save the
family member due to the familial bond.
Doctors, more specifically
obstetricians, often find themselves in a similar situation with pregnant patients.
Do they treat the woman, the fetus, or both? Pregnancy creates a unique
situation for doctors because to treat the fetus, the doctor must treat the woman.
Often, women willingly undergo a treatment because doctors believe that the
fetus receives the treatment’s benefits. What happens if a woman refuses a
treatment that benefits the fetus? Doctors encounter the same quandary as the
person in the hypothetical burning building. Should doctors honor the woman’s
refusal, or should they seek a court order to compel treatment? If the doctor
opts for judicial intervention, then the fetus often prevails over the woman
*Associate, Dorsey & Whitney LLP; B.S., Vanderbilt University; J.D., University of Tennessee,
Knoxville.
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because the courts balance the fetus’s rights against the woman’s rights. Courts,
however, should not conduct a balancing test, especially with procedures like
cesarean sections. The court-ordered procedure undercuts the woman’s
constitutional rights and makes her a glorified incubator, which courts may
open at their leisure. The balancing test sets women’s rights back centuries
because courts may unconsciously (or perhaps consciously) make value
judgments on the situation. The courts may skew established law because the
woman only contests the method of delivery.
II. CESAREAN BACKGROUND
Since ancient times, people have known and used the cesarean section.
Myths, legends, and Shakespearean plays have all referred to the surgery.1
Cesarean sections occurred in Egypt in 3,000 B.C., as well as other countries like
Greece, Italy, and Persia.2 Unlike today, doctors considered cesarean sections as
the final delivery option because the woman was often dead or dying after the
completed procedure.3 Until the sixteenth century, doctors performed cesarean
sections postmortem, but at the time live women began to undergo the
procedure as well.4 Women who chose to undergo the procedure had a high
risk of death.5 Doctors did not opt for this delivery method with a live woman
“unless [she] had been in labor for a very long time and was unable to deliver
vaginally” because of the high mortality rates from hemorrhaging and
infection.6 Cesarean sections, however, became routine after the Catholic
Church mandated that doctors perform these procedures to save children for the
purpose of baptism.7
The cesarean section gradually shifted from a final, last resort option to
another delivery method between the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century.8
The procedure’s mortality rates dropped with three surgical
developments: “adoption of the use of uterine sutures to arrest hemorrhage, the
adoption of aseptic technique, and changes in operative technique from the
classical to lower-segment operations.”9 These developments made the cesarean
section safer and caused mortality rates to decline. By the mid-twentieth

1. See MORTIMER ROSEN & LILLIAN THOMAS, THE CESAREAN MYTH 13 (1989). Some historical
figures may have been born via cesarean section: Gorgias of Sicily, Robert II of Scotland, Andrea
Doria, the Genovese admiral; Pope Gregory XIV, and Bishop Paulus of Spain. Vern L. Katz & Robert
C. Cefalo, History and Evolution of Cesarean Delivery, in CESAREAN DELIVERY 1, 3 (Jeffrey P. Phelan &
Steven L. Clark eds., 1988).
2. See ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 13.
3. See id. at 13-14.
4. See Katz & Cefalo, supra note 1, at 4.
5. See id. (noting that three women underwent a cesarean section, but only one survived).
6. Id. Even in the Renaissance, scholars had heated ethical debates on the use of cesarean
sections. Id. at 4-5.
7. See id. at 5.
8. See id.; ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 15.
9. Katz & Cefalo, supra note 1, at 5. Classical operations involve vertical cuts from the belly
button to the bikini line, while lower segment operations involve horizontal cuts at the bikini line.
ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 19-20.
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century, cesarean sections accounted for “about four percent of all births.”10
With the decline in maternal mortality during the 1930s and 1940s, doctors
created more reasons to perform the cesarean section, like the baby’s safety and
a mother’s history of previous cesarean sections.11
In today’s society, people often consider the cesarean section as a
frequently performed “low risk procedure,” and doctors have created more
cesarean section indicators thanks to fetal technology advances.12 These
indicators include medical and legal reasons, as well as convenience and
monetary factors.13 Cesarean sections, however, mainly occur if the fetus
appears to be in breech, dystocia, or fetal distress.14 Doctors also have nonmedical reasons for performing cesarean sections, like lack of experience with
vaginal births, possible lawsuits for not performing a cesarean section,15
convenience in the delivery schedule, and differences in insurance coverage.16
While doctors often perform cesarean sections for “legitimate” medical
reasons, the procedure is still major surgery. The woman receives a form of
anesthesia before the doctor begins the incisions.17 The doctor cuts through
skin, fat, muscle, tissue, the peritoneum, and uterus before cutting the amniotic
membrane and removing the baby.18 The doctor then removes the placenta,
closes the incisions, and places about seven sets of stitches into the woman’s
body.19
Even with a “successful delivery,” the woman is not out of danger. The
surgery poses mortality risks to the mother and the fetus, which is often four
times higher than the vaginal birth.20 In spite of this risk, the cesarean section is
one of the most commonly performed medical procedures.21 In 2004, 29.1% of
all childbirths occurred by cesarean section, which is the highest rate ever
10. ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 15.
11. Katz & Cefalo, supra note 1, at 12-13.
12. ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 15; see also Norbert Gleicher et al., Methods for Safe
Reduction of Cesarean Section Rates, in CESAREAN SECTION: GUIDELINES FOR APPROPRIATE UTILIZATION
141, 143 (Bruce L. Flamm & Edward J. Quilligan eds., 1995) (stating that the cesarean section is the
most frequently performed surgical procedure in the United States).
13. Bruce L. Flamm, Cesarean Delivery in the United States: A Summary of the Past 20 Years, in
CESAREAN SECTION, supra note 12, at 1, 6.
14. See, e.g., ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 23-39 (explaining the various cesarean section
indicators). Other medical factors indicate a cesarean section like postdate pregnancy, premature
rupture of the membrane, placenta previa, and various mother-related illnesses. See id. at 45.
15. Id. at 56.
16. See Gleicher et al., supra note 12, at 142-43; see also Flamm, supra note 13, at 6 (listing the
doctors’ reasons for performing cesarean sections); ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 56 (listing the
doctors’ reasons for performing cesarean sections with the supporting rationales).
17. ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 18-19. Women can choose from three types of anesthesia:
spinal, epidural, or general. Id.
18. Id. at 19-20. Prior to cutting the amniotic membrane, the woman has lost about 150
centiliters of blood. Id. at 20.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 63. Women have a mortality rate of “35.9 deaths per 100,000,” and infants have a
mortality rate of “9.2 per 100,000.” Daniel R. Levy, The Maternal-Fetal Conflict: The Right of a Woman
to Refuse a Cesarean Section Versus the State’s Interest in Saving the Life of the Fetus, 108 W. VA. L. REV.
97, 99 (2005).
21. See Gleicher et al., supra note 12, at 143.
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reported in the United States, and shows an increase from 27.5% in 2003.22 The
rate of cesarean sections, however, shows no signs of decreasing. First-time
cesarean section rates have increased from 19.1% in 2003 to approximately 23.4%
in 2007 while vaginal birth after cesarean (VBAC) rates have decreased from
10.6% in 2003 to approximately 8.0% in 2007.23 The possibility of fetal injury also
does not appear to be a deterrent. During a cesarean section, fetuses have a 1.1%
chance of injury with the most common injury being skin lacerations.24
Doctors consider all of these factors in their decision about whether a
woman needs a cesarean section. While doctors share the goal of “the birth of a
perfect baby to a healthy mother,”25 they may have other concerns that affect the
decision.26 Women, however, have become more educated about the procedure
for their own edification and due to increased media focus on the issue.27 With
this information and knowledge, women may refuse the procedure. Thus, a
pregnancy power struggle could result in which the doctor wants to perform a
procedure that the woman does not want. Unlike a normal doctor-patient
relationship, this decision affects an unborn third party. Thus, the courts may be
required to resolve the situation, which may cause the woman’s rights to be
completely subordinated to the fetus’s rights.
III. CESAREAN CASES
When most people think of the courts and reproductive rights, they
automatically conclude that the issue is abortion. Cesarean sections, however,
have also created controversy. These controversies rarely proceed past the trial
court, and the rulings are often not published. Thus, cases do not consistently
reach the appellate level, and many courts may not have addressed the issue.
As a result, while these courts reach different conclusions in their cases, the
conclusions fall into two camps: pro-women and pro-fetus.

22. Joyce A. Martin, et al., Preliminary Births for 2004: Infant and Maternal Health, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREV.,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/prelimbirths04/
prelimbirths04health.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2010) (noting that 29.1% translates into about 1.2
million births); Fastats – Birth – Method of Delivery, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/delivery.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
23. Martin, supra note 22; Fastats – Obstetrical Procedures, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV.,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/obgyn.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2010); QuickStats: Total and
Primary Cesarean Rate and Vaginal Birth after Previous Cesarean (VBAC) Rate – United States, 1989-2003,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV., http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
mm5402a5.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
24. Risk Factors for Fetal Injury During C-section Identified, REUTERS, Oct. 12, 2006.
25. Bruce L. Flamm, Introduction to CESAREAN SECTION, supra note 13, at xv, xvi.
26. Mary Beth Pfeiffer, C-section Rates Tick Upward as Doctors Fear Being Sued, POUGHKEEPSIE
JOURNAL, May 9, 2010, http://www.poughkeepsiejournal.com/article/20100509/NEWS01/
5090346/C-section-rates-tick-upward-as-doctors-fear-being-sued (noting that several factors
including previous cesarean sections, liability issues, the birth of multiple children at once, induced
labor, misread signs of fetal distress, and convenience have led to more cesarean sections).
27. See Flamm, supra note 13, at 3-4.
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A. Pro-Women
i. Illinois v. Mother Doe (In re Baby Boy Doe)28
The Illinois Appellate Court placed itself staunchly in the pro-women
camp. Mother Doe received treatment at a Chicago hospital during her
pregnancy.29 During a visit, Dr. Meserow, a board-certified OB/GYN affiliated
with the hospital, examined her.30 After some tests, he recommended a cesarean
section or induced labor, which she refused on religious grounds.31 Even with
an examination two weeks later, she still refused the recommended procedures,
and the hospital sought appointment as the fetus’s custodian.32 After a second
medical opinion and a judicial hearing, the court denied the petition.33
Even though the issue was resolved with the baby’s birth, the parties
appealed to settle the issue of compelled treatment because the situation could
occur again.34 The court did not address the earlier jurisdictional issue and
focused on whether the circuit court “should have balanced the rights of the
unborn but viable fetus . . . against the right of a competent woman to choose
the type of medical care she deemed appropriate . . . .”35 The court rejected a
balancing test, holding that a woman’s right to refuse invasive medical
treatment involving her pregnancy “must be honored, even in circumstances
where the choice may be harmful to her fetus.”36
The court based its decision on the past precedent of Stallman v.
Youngquist37 and a person’s right to refuse treatment.38 The court also
considered the uniqueness of pregnancy for women; even with pregnancy, a
woman can refuse lifesaving or invasive treatment as she can without a
pregnancy.39 The court did not think that a “woman’s rights can be
subordinated to fetal rights.”40 While the court analyzed the four state
countervailing interests, these interests did not override a woman’s refusal.41
Thus, the Illinois Appellate Court concluded that courts should honor a
woman’s choice and not use a balancing test.

28. 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
29. Id. at 326.
30. Id. at 326-27.
31. Id. at 327.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 328. A jurisdictional issue created some complications, and the appellate court
suggested that the Juvenile Court Act was inapplicable. Id. The circuit court agreed, and the state
filed an amended version of its petition. Id.
34. Id. at 329-30. Mother Doe vaginally delivered a healthy baby boy after the court denied the
state’s petition. Id. at 329.
35. Id. at 330.
36. Id.
37. 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
38. Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 330-31.
39. Id. at 332.
40. Id. (citing Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 361).
41. Id. at 334.
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ii. In re A.C.42
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals also joined the pro-women
camp, but, due to the case’s complexity, not as definitively as the Illinois
Appellate Court. A.C. was a married, twenty-seven year old woman in
remission from cancer.43 During her pregnancy’s twenty-fifth week, George
Washington University Hospital discovered an inoperable tumor in her lung.44
After discussing some options, A.C. had not decided whether she still wanted to
give birth, and the hospital requested a declaratory judgment to deliver the
fetus.45 A dispute arose over whether A.C. consented to a cesarean section
before twenty-eight weeks, and after several doctors’ testimony, the court
ordered a cesarean section.46 When A.C. regained consciousness from her heavy
sedation, doctors informed her of the order, but she appeared not to consent.47
The court reconvened but still ordered the cesarean section.48
Like In re Baby Boy Doe, this appeal addressed the issue after doctors
performed the procedure because the situation could occur again. The court
analyzed the issue under two standards. First, the court addressed a person’s
right to refuse treatment based on bodily integrity.49 The court acknowledged
that it could not “compel one person to permit a significant intrusion upon his
or her bodily integrity for the benefit of another person’s health.”50 The court
also dismissed the idea that pregnant women should be held to a different
standard due to their pregnancies. The court did not believe that a fetus had
rights “superior to those of a person who has already been born.”51 The court
acknowledged that the right to refuse treatment did not exist exclusively in the
common law and had “constitutional magnitude.”52 Second, because A.C.
appeared incompetent at the time, the court thought that the trial judge should
have used substituted judgment to reach a decision.53 To determine A.C.’s
decision, the court should have considered her wishes, along with her treatment
directions to family or friends.54
Thus, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that the trial
court should not have used a balancing test to reach its decision.55 The court,

42. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
43. Id. at 1238.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1239.
46. Id. at 1239-40.
47. Id. at 1240-41. The hospital department thought that the family’s wishes should be honored.
Id. at 1240.
48. Id. at 1240-41. The judge relied on the District of Columbia’s only decision on the issue, In re
Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 2, 1986). A.C.’s baby died a few hours
after the surgery, and A.C. died two days later. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1241.
49. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243.
50. Id. at 1243-44. The court also examined the four countervailing state interests, but these
factors were quickly dismissed. Id. at 1245-49.
51. Id. at 1244.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1249.
54. Id. at 1250-51.
55. Id. at 1247.
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however, did not hold that a woman’s refusal was absolute, because a situation
involving “truly extraordinary or compelling reasons” might override her
decision.56
B. Pro-Fetus
i. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc.57
The United States District Court of Northern Florida joined the pro-fetus
camp in 1999. In her second pregnancy, Ms. Pemberton wanted a vaginal
birth.58 Because doctors refused to perform a vaginal birth, she decided on a
home birth with a midwife.59 After more than a day of labor, she went to the
hospital for fluids.60 Dr. Thompson told Ms. Pemberton that a cesarean section
was needed, which she refused.61 The hospital refused to provide fluids, and
Ms. Pemberton left.62 The hospital sought a court order to compel treatment,
and a hearing occurred at the hospital.63 Additionally, the judge ordered Ms.
Pemberton to appear at the hospital, and law enforcement forced her to return
against her will.64 The hearing resulted in a court ordered cesarean section,
which was then performed.65 Ms. Pemberton sued the hospital for violating her
constitutional rights of bodily integrity, the right to refuse treatment, and the
right to make important decisions about bearing children “without undue
governmental interference.”66
The court acknowledged Ms. Pemberton’s constitutional rights but
determined that the state’s interest “in preserving the life of the unborn child”
outweighed her rights.67 The court based its conclusions on Roe v. Wade,68 in
which the Supreme Court “recognized the state’s interest in preserving a fetus
as it progresses toward viability.”69
The Pemberton court based the
imperativeness of the procedure on two rationales: the fetus’s imminent birth
and the mother’s desire to avoid a specific procedure, not the birth itself.70 The

56. Id. The court did not overrule In re Madyun, in which the court had compelled a cesarean
section. The concurrence agreed with this result, but advocated a balancing test because A.C.’s
situation was different “from those other potential patients for medical procedures that will aid
another person, for example, a potential donor of bone marrow for transplant.” Id. at 1256 (Belson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
58. Id. at 1249.
59. Id. Ms. Pemberton’s first pregnancy resulted in a vertical cesarean section, and vertical
incisions are more likely to cause uterine rupture if vaginal delivery is attempted during subsequent
pregnancies. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1250.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1251.
67. Id.
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
70. Id.
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risk of uterine rupture, which could have injured or killed Ms. Pemberton and
her fetus, as well as the fact that “medicine is not an exact science,” tipped the
balance in favor of a cesarean section.71
ii. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority72
The Georgia Supreme Court first considered the issue of compelled
cesarean sections in 1981 and held that a woman could be compelled to have a
cesarean section. Ms. Jefferson went to Griffin Spalding County Hospital for
prenatal treatment, where the hospital informed her that she had placenta
previa.73 The doctor told Ms. Jefferson that a cesarean section was necessary to
preserve her life, as well as her fetus.74 Ms. Jefferson refused the surgery, as well
as blood transfusions, on religious grounds, and the hospital sought to
determine whether the fetus “ha[d] any legal right to the protection of the
Court.”75
The Jefferson court also cited Roe in its analysis and held that a viable fetus
merited state protection based on the Constitution and “statutes prohibiting the
arbitrary termination of the life of an unborn fetus.”76 A Georgia criminal
statute on abortion reinforced this belief, and, as a result, the Georgia Supreme
Court found that the state’s duty to protect the fetus outweighed Ms. Jefferson’s
refusal.77 The court determined that “the life of defendant and of the unborn
child are, at the moment, inseparable, . . . [and deemed] it appropriate to
infringe upon the wishes of the mother to the extent it [was] necessary to give
the child an opportunity to live.”78 Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court ordered
Ms. Jefferson to undergo a cesarean section.
IV. REASONS SUPPORTING A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO REFUSE
Four courts have addressed the issue of court ordered cesarean sections,
but the judicial system has not yet reached a consensus. States often try to
obtain authority over the fetus through juvenile laws or child neglect statutes.79
These statutes often contain language on parents and their omissions to provide
71. Id. at 1253-54. The court, however, noted that if the case had not been “extraordinary and
overwhelming,” then Ms. Pemberton, rather than the state, would have had the “right to decide.”
Id. at 1254.
72. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam).
73. Id. at 458. Placenta previa “is an abnormal implantation of the placenta at or near the
internal opening of the uterine cervix so that it tends to precede the child at birth usually causing
severe maternal hemorrhage.” MEDLINE PLUS, Medical Dictionary, Placenta Previa, MERRIAM
WEBSTER, http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm?book=Medical&va=placenta
%20previa (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
74. Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
77. Id. at 460.
78. Id. at 458. While the concurring judge noted a possible jurisdictional issue involving the
juvenile court and concerns about interfering with religious freedom, he believed that the risks
merited intervention. Id. at 460-62 (Hill, J., concurring).
79. See D.C. CODE § 4-1321.01 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.03(3)(a) (West 2006); GA. CODE
ANN., § 49-5-180(5)(b) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.622(f) (West 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
39-15-401 to -402 (2003 & Supp. 2010).
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medical treatment, and states use this language to argue that women have an
obligation to provide medical treatment for their fetuses.80 Two courts have
found the states’ arguments on this topic, in conjunction with other state
interests, to prevail when a balancing test is used.81 Two other courts refused to
use a balancing test and did not find these arguments persuasive enough to
override the woman’s choice.82 Two arguments, however, exist for refusing a
cesarean section and not using a balancing test to resolve the situation: a right to
privacy and no duty to rescue another person.
V. RIGHT TO REFUSE BASED ON A PERSON’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Based on Abortion Law
While the Constitution “does not explicitly mention any right of privacy,”83
the Supreme Court has found that privacy rights exist in “specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights” by penumbras.84 These privacy rights encompass “the refusal
of medical treatment, marriage, contraception, procreation, family relationships,
and child rearing” and merit protection under various amendments.85 The
Supreme Court has held that “the right of privacy is a fundamental personal
right, emanating ‘from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we
live.’”86 When judges decide on fundamentality, they “are not left at large to
decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must
look to the ‘traditions and (collective) conscience of our people’ to determine
whether a principle is ‘so rooted (there) . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.’”87
The Supreme Court expanded the right to privacy even further with Roe v.
Wade. The Supreme Court extended the right to a woman’s decision
surrounding an abortion, though this right was not absolute.88 States could limit
a woman’s rights if a “compelling state interest” existed.89 The state’s interests
encompassed the rights “in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical

80. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 852(A) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010) (“[A]ny parent . . . having
custody or control of a child . . . who willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish necessary
food, clothing, shelter, monetary child support, medical attendance . . . .”) (emphasis added).
81. See Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla.
1999); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam).
82. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (en banc).
83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
84. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 484, 484 (1965).
85. Eric M. Levine, Comment, The Constitutionality of Court-Ordered Cesarean Surgery: A Threshold
Question, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 256 (1994).
86. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517
(1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
87. Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). The Supreme Court stated, “The pregnant woman
cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical
definitions of the developing young in the human uterus.” Id. at 159.
89. Id. at 156.
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standards, and in protecting potential life.”90 Thus, states could regulate
abortions when their interests became compelling, but not before that time.
In Colautti v. Franklin,91 the Supreme Court limited the state’s regulation
when the Court overturned a Pennsylvania statute that required a doctor to use
“the abortion technique ‘which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus
to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be necessary in
order to preserve the life or health of the mother.’”92 When examining the
statute, the Supreme Court focused on the statute’s use of the word necessary in
the context of selecting techniques to perform abortions.93 The Court stated that
the use of the word necessary implied “that a particular technique must be
indispensable to the woman’s life or health—not merely desirable—before it
may be adopted” when the doctor used an abortion technique which did not
“provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive.”94 Thus, the
doctor might engage in “a trade-off” between fetal survival and a woman’s
health, which was undesirable.95 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the idea of no
trade-offs between a woman’s health and her fetus’s survival in Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.96 In this case, the Supreme
Court noted that “no individual should be compelled to surrender the freedom
to make [reproductive decisions] for herself simply because her ‘value
preferences’ are not shared by the majority.”97
While these cases expanded on Roe, they also called its holding into
question, and the Supreme Court re-examined the abortion issue in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.98 The Supreme Court’s holding
had three parts: a woman enjoyed a right to obtain an abortion without state
interference before viability, the state held a right to restrict abortions after
viability unless the woman’s health was in danger, and the state possessed
legitimate interests in protecting the fetus’s life and the woman’s health.99 The
Supreme Court, however, couched these rights in relation to a woman’s unique
biological situation and reasoned, “the destiny of the woman must be shaped to
a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place
in society.”100 The Supreme Court noted that a state should not insist “upon its
own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the

90. Id. at 154. The Supreme Court, however, did not include the fetus in the definition of
“person,” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and states could not limit abortion
when it was “necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother.” Id. at 158, 164-65.
91. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
92. Id. at 390 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. § 6605(a) (West 1977), invalidated by Colautti, 439 U.S. 379,
401 (1979)).
93. Id. at 400.
94. Id. at 390.
95. Id. at 400-01.
96. 476 U.S. 747, 769 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
97. Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
99. Id. at 846.
100. Id. at 852.
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course of our history and our culture,” and the right to abortions has allowed
women to achieve equality in American society.101 A state, however, can
regulate abortions after viability and even provide information to ensure that
the woman makes an informed choice.102 At the same time, the state’s decision
to provide information cannot cause an “undue burden” on women.103 In spite
of this new test, the Supreme Court reaffirmed a woman’s right to have an
abortion, and found that a fetus was still not considered a person with a right to
life under the Fourteenth Amendment.104
i. Analysis of Refusal Based on Abortion Law
Under Roe and its progeny, women enjoy a right to privacy in their
reproductive decisions, though states can limit this right through their
compelling interest in protecting potential life. Some courts often use this
limitation to compel a “pregnant woman to undergo treatment intended to
benefit a viable fetus,” especially cesarean sections.105 The argument’s rationale
depends on women’s reproductive rights not being absolute: because the rights
are not absolute, and because the fetus could viably “live outside the womb,”
the state invokes its compelling interest in protecting life.106 Thus, the state must
balance the fetus’s viability against the only exception in post-viability abortion
law—preservation of the life or health of the woman. If the woman is not
endangered, then some courts assert that she must undergo treatment to benefit
the fetus and further the state’s compelling interest.
This argument, however, misinterprets Roe and its progeny.107 First, Roe
allows states to prohibit abortions after viability, but the case does not mention
anything about compelling treatment “to promote fetal health.”108 Second,
states cannot compel trade-offs between the woman and her fetus.109 If states
cannot impose trade-offs for post-viability abortions, “then they must be
unconstitutional for deliveries as well.”110 Doctors who pursue cesarean
sections have “presumably determined that the risks to maternal life or health
justify performing the cesarean section over vaginal delivery.”111 Thus, the
fetus’s chances of survival improve if doctors perform a cesarean section. The
101. Id.
102. Id. at 872-75.
103. Id. at 877. The Supreme Court adopted an “undue burden” test. An undue burden occurs
when “a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” Id.
104. Id. at 913-14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 158 (1973).
105. Lawrence J. Nelson & Nancy Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Life,
Liberty, and Law in Conflict, 259 JAMA 1060, 1062 (1988).
106. Levy, supra note 20, at 102.
107. See Nelson & Milliken, supra note 105, at 1062.
108. Id.
109. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400-01 (1979).
110. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans,
74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1992 (1986).
111. Levine, supra note 85, at 261; see Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1192 (stating that doctors “are
unlikely to seek court orders for surgery when there is only some indication that surgery would be
preferable”).
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woman’s chances of death or post-surgery complications, however, increase
with cesarean sections as opposed to women who give birth vaginally.112 Thus,
a trade-off occurs between the woman and the fetus, which violates the
constitutional standards established in Colautti and reaffirmed in Thornburgh.
Additionally, engaging in a trade-offs analysis places a value judgment on
women. States “assume that [women] owe this duty as a matter of course. This
assumption . . . appears to rest upon a conception of women’s role that has
triggered the protection of the Equal Protection Clause.”113 This perception of
women, however, is “no longer consistent with our understanding of the family,
the individual, or the Constitution.”114 Times have changed, and women are no
longer in the kitchen barefoot and pregnant. A balancing test causes the courts
to engage in a trade-off between the woman and the fetus and shows the courts’
indifference to an “individual’s freedom to make such judgments.”115
While most women would willingly make a trade-off for their fetuses, the
courts should be “constitutionally barred from forcing [her] to undergo medical
treatment for the sake of the fetus if that treatment endangers her life and health
in any way.”116 States possess a compelling interest in potential life, but this
interest does not imply that a trade-off must occur. By engaging in a trade-off,
the courts have determined that the woman’s risks are less than the fetus’s risks.
Thus, based on a right to reproductive privacy, the courts should not apply
a balancing test. By making a trade-off between the woman’s rights and fetus’s
rights, the courts violate the constitutional principles established in Roe and its
progeny.
B. Based on Informed Consent and Bodily Integrity
Courts may honor a refusal of a cesarean section under a right to
reproductive privacy, but a stronger justification is the right to refuse medical
treatment based on informed consent and bodily integrity. Pregnancy, however,
is a conundrum in the legal and medical fields because by refusing treatment,
the woman exercises her right of refusal, but the fetus never has an opportunity
to refuse. While this challenge does exist, the woman’s right to refuse stems
from her right to privacy through informed consent, as well as bodily integrity,
and outweighs the state’s four countervailing interests, which means that courts
have no reason to use a balancing test.
Any medical procedure requires the patient’s (or guardian’s) consent.
Without consent, the doctor will commit an assault and a trespass on the patient
regardless of the procedure’s success or failure.117 Consent is critical because
society considers that “no right is more sacred or is more carefully guarded by

112. Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1992. Some rare situations exist in which a vaginal delivery has
as much risk as a cesarean delivery. Id.
113. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 897 (majority opinion).
115. Id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. See Nelson & Milliken, supra note 105, at 1062.
117. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled by Bing v.
Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
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the common law than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law.”118 The idea of bodily integrity helped to
develop the informed consent doctrine because “every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done to her own
body.”119 Thus, doctors could only operate with patient consent unless an
emergency arose with an unconscious patient that required a necessary
operation.120 While “general consent” was sufficient early on, courts began to
require that doctors inform their patients of surgery’s risks, possible outcomes,
and necessary follow-ups if these factors materially affected the patient’s
decision.121 Patients generally lack medical training, and, to make the right
decision, they must understand the important issues related to treatment.122
Thus, doctors became liable if they did not disclose these issues regarding the
impending procedure to their patients.
In the seminal case Canterbury v. Spence,123 the United States Court of
Appeals in the District of Columbia shaped the informed consent doctrine. In
this case, a young man consented to surgery on a ruptured disc.124 The surgery
appeared uneventful, but the man fell out of bed, which resulted in
complications,125 and the patient suffered paralysis below the waist.126 The
operation had a one percent chance of paralysis, which the patient was unaware
of prior to surgery.127 The patient believed that the doctor should have informed
him of this risk because it would have affected his decision.128 The court held
that the doctor had a duty to inform the patient about the treatment’s risks if
they materially affected the patient’s decision.129 With this standard, informed
consent “has become firmly entrenched in American tort law” and indicates the
importance of respect for patient autonomy, even if the doctor considers the
decision ridiculous or neurotic.130
While informed consent provides patients with information to decide
whether to pursue the treatment, a corollary to this right exists. If patients have
a choice about consenting to a procedure, then “the patient generally possesses
the right to not consent . . . to refuse treatment.”131 This right to refuse medical
treatment has a basis in “a constitutional right of privacy,” which encompasses
Fourteenth Amendment issues, and a “common law right to self determination

118. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
119. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
120. See id.
121. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
122. See Levine, supra note 85, at 272.
123. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
124. Id. at 777.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 778.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 787.
130. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990); see Rhoden, supra
note 110, at 1970.
131. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
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and informed consent.”132 Thus, people may refuse medical treatment even if
the decision results in their deaths.133 Even if medical technology could restore a
person to perfect health, the courts generally abide by the patient’s decision.134
While the right to refuse medical treatment “has come to be widely
recognized and respected by the courts of the nation,” this right, like women’s
abortion rights, is not absolute.135 States possess interests that counter the
patient’s right to refuse treatment: “the preservation of life, the protection of the
interests of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.”136 Pregnancy,
however, creates a unique quandary with refusal of treatment: can a pregnant
woman refuse treatment even if the fetus could suffer harm? Supporters of
court ordered cesarean sections argue that the four countervailing state interests
outweigh the rights of self-determination, informed consent, and bodily
integrity. This argument, however, fails to overcome these long established
rights of every free person in the United States.
i.

The Four State Factors

1. Preservation of Life
First, the preservation of life is often considered the most important state
interest, and the state may “assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life.”137 This interest is very compelling when the person’s life “can be
saved where the affliction is curable,” but the state must acknowledge “an
individual’s right to avoid circumstances in which the individual . . . would feel
that efforts to sustain life demean or degrade [her] humanity.”138 While courts
recognize that the refusal of treatment involves a person’s quality of life and
should be left to the patient, they often examine other factors like recovery
chances, the treatment’s invasiveness, and “the patient’s desires and experience
of pain and enjoyment.”139 When a person can regain good health through a
minimally invasive procedure, like a blood transfusion, the preservation of life
interest becomes more compelling.140 Despite the increased value, courts have
upheld a patient’s decision to refuse a minimally invasive and possibly life
saving treatment.141

132. Id. at 272.
133. Id. at 273.
134. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. 1972) (upholding a Jehovah’s Witness’s decision to
refuse a potentially life-saving blood transfusion).
135. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986); see Cruzan, 497 U.S
at 270.
136. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
137. Id. at 282.
138. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 635.
139. Id. at 635-36. (stating that the wife of a man in a persistent vegetative state could have her
husband’s feeding tube removed and discontinue his artificial means of survival).
140. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (1964) (per
curiam) (holding that hospitals may administer blood transfusions if necessary to save a woman’s
life or the life of her child).
141. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 375 (D.C. 1972).
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If the procedure’s invasiveness increases and requires surgery, then the
state’s interest becomes less compelling as the patient’s autonomy is infringed.
Courts are less willing to override a patient’s decision if “the procedure may
threaten the safety or health of the individual.”142 In Winston v. Lee,143 the
Supreme Court refused to compel a surgery to remove a bullet for evidence
because of the surgery’s risks to the suspect.144 The concerns over a surgery’s
risks also occur in pregnancy cases. A Massachusetts court refused to compel a
woman to undergo a purse string operation during her pregnancy, which would
have required suturing the woman’s cervix to ensure that it “[would] hold the
pregnancy.”145 The state had not proven whether the operation was necessary,
whether the pregnancy could not be carried to term without the procedure, and
what the risks of impact on the woman were.146 These types of concerns affect
the court’s view of whether an invasive medical procedure helps or hurts the
state’s preservation of life argument.
a. Analysis of the Preservation of Life
Cesarean sections support the state’s preservation of life argument because
the outcome generally results in a success for all parties, but success is not
enough. Cesarean sections may improve the fetus’s chance to be restored to full
health, but the procedure, with its increased morbidity and mortality rates,
actually places the woman’s life at risk.147 The woman has a greater chance of
dying with a cesarean section, which implies that the state is gambling with the
woman’s life. The state claims a desire to preserve the lives of both parties, but
it places the woman, who is likely a productive member of society, at risk for the
chance that the fetus will become a productive member of society. The state’s
logic contains flaws and appears counterintuitive.
Additionally, a cesarean section is incredibly invasive for a woman. The
doctor cuts through several layers of tissue and enters her body to remove the
fetus.148 This level of invasiveness surpasses the level that the Supreme Court
has considered unacceptable.149 The invasiveness and number of incisions
required in a cesarean section also increase the woman’s chances for infection,
which places her life at risk again.150 Thus, the state’s interest in preserving life
appears unmet by compelling a woman to undergo a cesarean section. While
the state may preserve the fetus’s life, the woman’s life may not be saved, which

142. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985).
143. 470 U.S. at 753.
144. Id. at 764-65. (referring to the Fourth Circuit’s refusal to compel the surgery because “the
greater intrusion and the larger incisions increase the risks of infection”).
145. Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 396-97 (Mass. 1983).
146. Id.
147. See supra Part II.
148. See id.
149. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 764 (suggesting that surgery to remove a bullet without the patient’s
consent was an intrusion of personal privacy and integrity as it would require probing the muscle
tissue and could result in damage to the muscles and nerves); Taft, 446 N.E.2d at 397 (holding that a
purse string operation may unjustifiably restrict a woman’s constitutional right to privacy as it
would involve surgery to suture her cervix to hold the pregnancy).
150. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 764; supra Part II.
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appears to defeat the state’s overall goal. This interest, however, usually
involves only one patient, not two, and to address the situation fully, this
argument must consider the protection of innocent third parties.
2. Protection of Innocent Third Parties
Second, the state has an interest in the protection of innocent third parties.
This interest may not have the most significance in right to refuse cases, but in
cesarean sections cases, it acquires pertinence because the woman determines
the fetus’s fate as well as her own. Courts often cite this factor in overriding a
patient’s refusal if the patient already has minor children.151 In these situations,
the state’s main concern involves the child’s emotional well-being to have two
parents.152 Additionally, the state has concerns about children becoming a
burden to the state.153 Courts believe that parents should not be permitted “to
abandon a child” and that parents have “a responsibility to the community to
care” for their children.154 If the courts think that extended family and financial
planning adequately meet these factors, then they will likely uphold a patient’s
decision.
a. Analysis of the Protection of Innocent Third Parties
This argument is strong, but it still does not override the woman’s right to
refuse because it applies to children already born. As stated earlier, courts do
not consider fetuses, unlike children already born, to be people under the
Fourteenth Amendment.155
Courts considered situations that involved
protecting already born children from abandonment.156 Fetuses should not
receive an unfair expansion of their rights over a grown woman’s rights when
the fetuses have not merited those protections yet.157 The fetus may not survive
childbirth or may be stillborn, which means that the doctor cut open the
woman’s body for no reason. Additionally, these cases and courts have focused
mainly on whether the child might be abandoned and become a burden to the
state.158 A woman’s refusal of a cesarean section, however, may not necessarily
result in the fetus becoming a ward of the state. The woman may deliver
naturally with no complications.159 The fetus could die during or prior to
childbirth, or because of the compelled procedure the woman and fetus could

151. See In re President & Dir. of Georgetown Coll., Inc. (In re Georgetown), 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(D.C. Cir. 1964); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 824-25
(Fla. 1994); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
152. See Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 826.
153. See Osborne, 294 A.2d at 374; Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 827 n.12 (noting that the state’s only
concern was “that the children would be cared for and would not be a burden on the State” when
their mother refused a blood transfusion).
154. Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1008.
155. See supra Part V.A.
156. See Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1008; Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
157. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
158. See Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1008; Osborne, 294 A.2d at 374; Dubreil, 629 So. 2d 819, 825 (Fla.
1994) (citing Wons v. Pub. Health Trust, 500 So. 2d 679, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
159. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that the mother
delivered the fetus naturally before the court resolved the proceedings).
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die on the operating table. In all of these situations, the fetus does not become a
ward of the state. The fetus, however, has a greater chance of becoming a ward
of the state because of the cesarean section’s increased morbidity and mortality
rates to the woman during and after surgery.160 Thus, the state preserves the
fetus’s life by a cesarean section, but the state does not protect all of the fetus’s
interests. The woman could die from the cesarean section, which could cause
the fetus to become a ward of the state and deprives the fetus of having two
parents. Like the state’s preservation of life argument, this argument could still
lead, ironically, to the fetus becoming a ward of the state or having one or no
parents, which completely defeats the state’s overall goal.
3. Prevention of Suicide
Third, the prevention of suicide is a weak argument. By refusing a “life
sustaining treatment,” courts should not view a patient as “attempt[ing] to
commit suicide.”161 This rationale works for two reasons. First, even if the
refusal results in death, the death would be due to “the underlying disease, and
not the result of a self inflicted injury.”162 Second, a person may wish to live but
without the specific treatment.163 Neither of these reasons fit the concept of
suicide. Suicide is defined as “taking one’s life,” the act is intentionally done,
and the person often lacks the will to live.164 These factors, however, can be
misconstrued in a woman’s refusal and used as a way to circumvent her refusal.
a. Analysis of Prevention of Suicide
If a woman refuses a cesarean section, she is not trying to commit suicide.
She, like a Jehovah’s Witness refusing blood, chooses a different path from the
one that doctors prefer. This choice may increase her chances of dying, but the
situation may unfold with no complications and without the undesired
treatment.165 She is not intentionally killing herself. Additionally, a woman
who carries a pregnancy to term seems like an unlikely candidate for suicide. If
she were suicidal, why would she go to the hospital? She could stay home and
do nothing. Plus, most women would not give birth and abandon the child with
their deaths.
Finally, living in the technologically advanced twenty-first century, a
woman has more than one delivery option, which itself implies a choice. If she
lived during the sixteenth century, then she would have had no other option
than to give birth vaginally until the fetus was born, or she died, which would
then result in a cesarean section. Now, the woman who refuses a cesarean
section merely allows nature to take its course, which is not the same as
imposing an intentional, self-inflicted injury. While some might fail to
160. See supra Part II.
161. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp. Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass. 1986).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972) (The patient, a Jehovah’s Witness,
stated, “I wish to live, but with no blood transfusions.”).
164. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 2004); see In re Georgetown, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
165. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting that the mother delivered
the fetus naturally before the court could determine if a compelled cesarean section was necessary).
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understand her decision or view it as irrational, the decision is hers to make as
an autonomous individual. The state’s suicide argument is weak because the
refusal, while an intentional choice, is not a self-inflicted injury. Also, the
woman may not die from her refusal, which obliterates the factor of taking one’s
life because death is not guaranteed. The state’s argument on this interest
appears so incredulous because a woman, who likely nurtured and cared for the
fetus until delivery, does not mesh with society’s vision of a suicidal person.
4. Maintenance of the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession
Finally, the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession
does not support the pro-fetus camp. Courts generally do not require doctors or
hospitals to violate their moral or ethical principles and do allow them to refuse
to withhold “treatment if they believe that it will cause the patient’s death.”166
Thus, if the doctors do not want to perform a court ordered cesarean section due
to the belief that it will cause the patient’s death, they do not have to perform
the procedure. This scenario, however, will likely not occur because doctors
often seek court approval for the procedure.
Professional societies, however, have taken a stance on the issue and
“suggest that doctors accede to the patients’ and families’ needs and
wishes . . . .”167 In fact, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG) and the American Medical Association (AMA) believe that the final
decision on cesarean sections belongs to the woman.168 The ACOG states:
Once a patient has been informed of the material risks and benefits involved
with a treatment, test, or procedure, that patient has the right to exercise full
autonomy in deciding whether to undergo the treatment, test, or procedure, or
whether to make a choice among a variety of treatments, tests or procedures. In
the exercise of that autonomy, the informed patient also has the right to refuse
to undergo any of these treatments, tests, or procedures. . . . Such a refusal [of
consent] may be based on religious beliefs, personal preference, or comfort.169

Although some doctors disagree with the ACOG’s perspective, the ACOG
and AMA’s statements undermine the state’s argument “that professional
integrity supports compulsory treatment.”170
a. Analysis of Maintenance of the Ethical Integrity of the
Medical Profession
If the woman refuses treatment, the doctor must abide by her decision.
Ethically, the patient’s decision binds the doctors, which the ACOG’s committee
opinion supports. Doctors may not agree with the decision ethically or morally,
but unless they want to commit a battery or disrespect a patient’s wishes by
obtaining a court order, they must accept the decision. Additionally, courts
166. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 632, 639.
167. ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 88.
168. See LYNN M. PALTROW, NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, COERCIVE MEDICINE
(2004), available at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/file/Coercive_Medicine.pdf.
169. Id. (quoting AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, INFORMED REFUSAL, Op. No.
237 (2000)).
170. Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1972.
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should realize that by granting a court order, they act counter to the medical
community’s standards, which were promulgated for the doctors’ benefit.171
Courts must consider the ethical implications of compelling the cesarean
section due to the doctors’ ethical obligation to honor the patient’s wishes and to
do no harm. By forcing a woman to undergo a cesarean section, the doctors,
with court approval, violate this oath. The doctors inflict mental, as well as
physical harm, on the woman by disregarding her wishes, cutting her open, and
removing her fetus in an undesired manner. Thus, courts must maintain the
doctors’ ethical integrity by upholding the woman’s right to refuse treatment.
The ACOG’s standards and the Hippocratic Oath derail the state’s argument
that the profession’s integrity supports mandated treatment.
Taking all of these factors together, the state’s interests do not outweigh a
woman’s right to refuse medical treatment. Once a doctor fully informs the
woman of the surgery’s benefits and the risks of refusal, the doctors and courts
should abide by her decision. Courts should not use a balancing test that
weighs her privacy rights against the fetus’s rights. Her right to privacy based
on informed consent and bodily integrity trump the state’s countervailing
interests.
VI. RIGHT TO REFUSE BASED ON NO DUTY TO RESCUE ANOTHER
Besides a right to refuse based on the right to privacy, women also have an
argument involving the common law idea of no duty to rescue another person
and equal protection under the law. This argument refutes claims that pregnant
women have a duty to rescue their fetuses. Any “rescue obligation” violates the
Fourteenth Amendment and perpetuates a paternalistic society.
A persistent idea in American law is that one does not have a duty to
rescue another person.172 While early contemplations of the law considered
active and passive roles in the risk separately, the law now considers these roles
together.173 The overall idea, however, has not changed: “an actor whose
conduct has not created a risk of physical harm to another has no duty of care to
the other” unless a court determines that an “affirmative” duty exists.174 Thus, a
person has “no duty of care when another is at risk for reasons other than the
conduct of the actor, even though the actor may be in a position to help . . . .”175
This idea, however, is qualified by the existence of special relationships,
which establish an affirmative duty to act.176 These relationships range from
innkeepers and guests; landlords and tenants; and common carriers and
passengers.177 The exception also encompasses custodians who are “required by
law to take custody . . . of the other” and “[have] a superior ability to protect the

171. See PALTROW, supra note 168.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
173. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS HARM § 37 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft Apr. 6, 2005).
174. Id. § 37.
175. Id. § 37 cmt. b.
176. Id. § 40(a) (“An actor in a special relationship with another owes the other a duty of
reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship.”).
177. See id. § 40(b).
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other.”178 Parents and their dependent children belong in the custodian
exception.179 Thus, parents usually have a duty to rescue their children.
Without a special relationship, a person generally has no duty to rescue another
because this country has a tradition of siding with individual freedom and
autonomy.180
While people do not have a duty to rescue others, they try to compel rescue
in certain contexts, like organ donation and bone marrow. In McFall v. Shimp,181
Mr. McFall had a bone marrow disease, and without a transplant, he would
die.182 Mr. Shimp matched Mr. McFall as a donor, but he refused to donate.183
The Pennsylvania court acknowledged that the common law provided “that one
human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save
another human being or to rescue.”184 The court also noted that society
respected a person and wanted to prevent an “individual from being invaded
and hurt by another.”185 The court held that Mr. Shimp could not be compelled
“to submit to an intrusion of his body” because it “would defeat the sanctity of
the individual and would impose a rule which would know no limits . . . .”186
While the court thought that Mr. Shimp’s choice contained moral flaws, it
analogized a forced procedure to Nazism and the Inquisition.187
While that situation involved two adults with no special relationship, the
courts have also not compelled a rescue in situations involving siblings or
natural fathers. In the case of In re Richardson,188 Roy was a seventeen-year-old
mentally disabled boy, and his sister needed a kidney transplant.189 After the
entire family underwent testing, Roy was deemed the best match.190 The father
wanted authorization for the procedure, but the court held that Roy had a “right
to be free in his person from bodily intrusion to the extent of loss of an organ
unless such loss to be in the best interest of the minor.”191 Thus, he had no
obligation to rescue his sister.
While dialysis provided an alternative in Richardson, bone marrow
situations are trickier, but courts have still upheld a family member’s refusal not

178. See id. § 40(b)(7)(a)-(b).
179. See id. § 40 cmt. n.
180. See id. § 40 cmt. o (noting that the special relationships list is not exclusive, and courts may
add exceptions in some situations, especially with other family members).
181. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1978).
182. Id. at 90.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 91.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 92. The court used vivid language to reinforce its point: “For a society which respects
the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and
suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of
jurisprudence.” Id.
188. 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
189. Id. at 186.
190. Id. at 187.
191. Id. The court also noted and considered that the sister could survive with renal dialysis for
an indefinite period of time. Id. at 186.
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to rescue another person. In the case of In re George,192 the son, who had been
adopted, suffered from leukemia.193 He could stay alive on drugs temporarily,
but to survive, he needed a bone marrow transplant.194 He sought information
on his natural father to determine if he was a possible match.195 Despite the
court’s attempts to convince the natural father to consent to testing, he refused,
regardless of the court’s offers of anonymity.196 The son argued that the trial
court abused its discretion, but the Missouri Court of Appeals thought that the
son’s need, along with the satisfaction of his need and the father’s cooperation,
merited consideration.197 The court ruled that his situation did not merit the
adoption records to be unsealed, which implied that the natural father had no
duty to rescue his son.198
A. Analysis of No Duty to Rescue
Cesarean sections have similar levels of need and intrusion as organ or
bone marrow donations. The doctors and courts, however, rationalize the first
procedure differently from the latter procedures. The women want to give
birth, but they do not want to undergo the particular delivery procedure,
whereas people who refuse to donate an organ or bone marrow want nothing to
do with the whole situation.199 The doctors and courts rationalize that refusing a
particular delivery method is not as significant or intrusive as refusing an organ
donation. Overriding the decision is only a minor detail for them. This
rationalization, however, reeks of paternalism and treats women as if they made
a hysterical decision during labor. The people noted in the above cases appear
to have more control over their rights in the doctors’ and courts’ minds on
whether to rescue someone than a woman who refuses a cesarean section.
Additionally, many contend that pregnant women have a “special
relationship” with their fetuses, which vitiates the no duty to rescue rule. They
base this argument on the biological fact that what happens to the woman
affects the fetus. They contend that a woman has certain obligations and is
compelled to “protect [the fetus] in [her] charge from risks posed by third
persons,” which in this situation would be herself.200 To reinforce this point,
some people argue that women who do not undergo abortions waive their
rights to refuse medical procedures, like a cesarean section, that aid the fetus.201
Thus, a woman must provide her fetus “with such things as ‘necessary medical
attendance.’”202

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 616-17. The “father” claimed that he was not the natural father. Id. at 616.
Id. at 622-23.
Id. at 623.
See Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1979.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 173, § 40 cmt. n.
See Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1979.
George J. Annas, Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13, 13 (1986).
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This special relationship argument has some merit, but it does not override
a woman’s decision. First, women have a “right to bear children,” and no
waiver of that right ever occurs.203 Second, comparing the parent and child
category to the woman and fetus stretches the Fourteenth Amendment. A child
is a person, but under the Fourteenth Amendment, the fetus is not considered a
person, which implies that the custodian special relationship does not apply to
pregnant women unless courts expand the list.204 Third, while parents have an
obligation to act in their children’s best interests, these interests do not infringe
on their bodily integrity.205 Parents do not have to sacrifice their lives or organs
for their children even though they likely would if the situation required it.
With a pregnant woman, the doctor must infringe on the woman’s bodily
integrity to rescue the fetus, which “degrades and dehumanizes the mother and
treats her as an inert container.”206 Finally, the special relationship applies only
to women. Courts do not compel fathers, siblings, or other family members to
infringe on their bodily integrity and save family members.207 Courts could
extend the special relationship standard beyond parent and child, but the courts
have chosen to maintain the standard.208 Thus, courts have created a double
standard between men and women involving their bodily integrity rights and
aiding their children. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, courts cannot “deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”209 Courts
do not compel fathers to infringe on their bodily integrity to save their
children.210 By forcing women to undergo cesarean sections, the courts reinforce
stereotypical gender roles, relegating the woman to the kitchen, barefoot and
pregnant, and violating her equal protection rights. Until the courts require
both parents to surrender their bodily integrity rights to aid their children,
women should not be compelled to give up their rights to refuse treatment
based on a special relationship argument.
If courts treat women as “mere means” to delivering a fetus based on their
special relationship, which fathers do not have, then Margaret Atwood’s
cautionary tale, The Handmaid’s Tale, becomes more likely.211 The Handmaid’s
Tale involves a society in which only some women reproduce, and society
considers reproduction as their job.212 To avoid this mindset, the “special
203. Id. at 14.
204. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 173, §
40 cmt. o.
205. George J. Annas, She’s Going to Die: The Case of Angela C., 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23, 24
(1988).
206. Id. at 24.
207. William Ruddick & William Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 10, 12
(1982); see In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973); In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614, 623
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see also McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 92 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1978).
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 173, § 40 cmt. o.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
210. See, e.g., In re George, 630 S.W.2d at 622-23 (holding that adoption records that would
presumably identify a son’s biological father could not be unsealed based solely on the son’s medical
need).
211. Frank. A. Chervenak & Laurence B. McCullough, Justified Limits on Refusing Intervention, 21
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12, 12 (1991); see Annas, supra note 202, at 13.
212. Annas, supra note 202, at 13.
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relationship” exception should not apply to pregnant women because of gender
discrimination and violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE FOUR CESAREAN CASES
Given all of this information, the Illinois Appellate Court reached the right
result with In re Baby Boy Doe. The court refused to use a balancing test because
the “woman’s competent choice” trumped the state’s rights.213 The court
acknowledged her right to refuse treatment, the uniqueness of her situation, and
her constitutional rights.214 In the case of In re A.C., the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals also reached the correct result by honoring a woman’s refusal,
but the decision depended on informed consent and bodily integrity.215 The
court, however, thought that a “truly extraordinary” situation for overriding the
woman’s decision could occur. While an extreme, inconceivable situation could
arise, the courts should not leave the situation undefined. Without a standard, a
slippery slope exists, which could eventually encroach on the woman’s decision
and place the court back in the same quandary that existed with In re A.C.216
The Jefferson and Pemberton courts, however, employed paternalistic
approaches. Both courts used Roe and its compelling interests’ concept to
support their decisions.217 As stated earlier, Roe does not pertain to compelling
medical treatments for fetuses but to abortions.218 Second, these courts required
women to endure trade-offs. Women would be forced to undergo an unwanted
surgical procedure for their fetuses. The procedure increased their chances of
morbidity and mortality, because it benefited the fetus.219 Finally, these courts
likely engaged in value judgments on the situations. Ms. Jefferson and Ms.
Pemberton wanted natural births. The courts may have implicitly or directly
considered the idea that “the woman commits herself to obedience and maternal
devotion; she agrees to sacrifice any distinct self interest for the sake of her
child . . . .”220 Regardless, the Jefferson and Pemberton courts felt that the state’s
interests outweighed the women’s choices, and these decisions were likely based
the idea that the state possesses an overwhelming interest to preserve all life.
While determining how personal perspectives may affect courts’ decisions is
difficult, a balancing analysis could unconsciously cause the courts’ personal
views to influence the decision. These courts misinterpreted well-established
ideas of informed consent, bodily integrity, abortion, and no duty to rescue by
misapplying Roe and using a balancing test to order cesarean sections.

213. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
214. See generally id.
215. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1242 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
216. Id.
217. See Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1251-52 (N.D.
Fla. 1999); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981) (per
curiam).
218. See Nelson & Milliken, supra note 105, at 1062.
219. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769 (1986),
overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 400-01 (1979); Rhoden, supra note 110, at 1992.
220. Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 207, at 12.
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VIII. SOLUTIONS TO THE COURT ORDERED CESAREAN SECTION
Court ordered cesarean sections come up infrequently in the courts, but
when the situation occurs, it occurs in the worst possible way. The decisionmaking time is often limited and the doctors face a pressing deadline. Parents
are unprepared to defend their position and the courts lack the time to analyze
the law and issue properly. While the best solution would be for the Supreme
Court to address the issue, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will receive and
accept a petition on this issue. The reason that a case may never reach that level
of review is because only four recorded cases have reached the appellate level.
Thus, unless there is an increase in the number of cases heard in appellate courts
and a circuit split develops, the Supreme Court may not see the need to address
this issue. In lieu of Supreme Court resolution, the hospitals, patients, and
doctors must establish other methods that could prevent judicial intervention.
First, the hospital could accept the woman’s refusal and not perform a
cesarean section. As long as the women appear competent and fully informed
of the risks of refusing treatment, doctors fulfill their ethical duty. This idea,
however, might conflict with a doctor’s desire to save the fetus, but the decision
belongs to the woman.
Second, doctors could receive more training in alternative delivery
methods like VBAC, vaginal breech delivery, or delivery by forceps.221 Doctors
frequently perform cesarean sections because they learned the procedure in
medical school and often lack experience in other methods.222 At the slightest
sign of trouble, doctors usually opt for a cesarean section, which may conflict
with the woman’s wishes. With training in alternative delivery methods,
doctors could deliver the fetus safely and comply with the woman’s wishes.
Third, doctors perform cesarean sections to avoid malpractice suits, and by
performing a cesarean section, the doctors can prove that they complied with
the standard of care.223 If malpractice claims were reduced through tort reform,
then the number of cesarean sections performed would likely decrease. Even
with a woman’s consent, doctors might still have liability concerns. If a woman
gives informed consent for her cesarean section refusal, then she likely has no
legal case against the doctor, and lawsuits brought by the father or child should
also fail.224 Doctors, however, think that compelling a cesarean section will
reduce, if not absolve, their possible liability issues.225 While this rationale is
misguided, the legal field needs to address the doctors’ liability concerns. With
reform, the doctors can focus on the best course of treatment in compliance with
the patient’s wishes rather than the possibility of a lawsuit.226

221. Gleicher et al., supra note 12, at 143.
222. See id.
223. See generally ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 108-09 (stating that doctors often perform
cesarean sections as defensive medicine to show that they did everything possible).
224. Nelson & Milliken, supra note 105, at 1063.
225. See id.
226. In addition to reducing liability, hospitals must equalize the costs of vaginal births and
cesarean sections. Cesarean sections are more expensive than vaginal births, and these excess costs
are covered by insurance. Unless changes are made, profit-focused doctors will be more likely to
use cesarean sections. ROSEN & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 53.
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Finally, the doctor and patient must discuss these issues earlier in the
pregnancy. The doctor needs to know about the woman’s views on childbirth
because the doctor will need to present her with the available options and risks
of each choice. The woman then has time to research these options and ask
questions. If they do not discuss their views and options, then a court ordered
intervention could result, which destroys the doctor-patient relationship and
trust.227 The relationship will change from a joint venture for the best possible
outcome into a hostile relationship.228 By discussing the issues earlier, the
woman can decide whether their views mesh, or whether she needs to search for
a new doctor. Additionally, the discussion prevents any last minute chaos and
confusion that a birth, especially a problematic one, can create. Discussion
prevents the doctor and the woman from becoming enemies during the most
important time of the relationship—the delivery.
IX. CONCLUSION
Court ordered cesarean sections happen infrequently, but they can occur.
Because of their infrequency, courts have reached different results on the issue.
In these situations, however, courts should honor the woman’s wishes and not
use a balancing test. By using a balancing test, the woman becomes nothing
more than a shell protecting the fetus until birth. Women have come a long way
since the image of a docile, subservient woman and have the same legal rights as
men in this country. A balancing test, however, causes the courts to sweep aside
the woman’s rights and places her firmly in the Middle Ages, when the cesarean
section was a last resort. While doctors face a quandary about who to treat with
a pregnant patient, they, as well as the courts, should honor the woman’s
decision. By acting contrary to her decision, the woman’s constitutional rights
are violated, and she is placed back in the kitchen, barefoot and pregnant.
Courts should not presume to know what is best for the woman. Thus, they
should abide by the woman’s informed refusal of a cesarean section and not use
a balancing test, which could result in a trade off between her rights and the
fetus’s rights.

227. See Veronika E.B. Kolder, et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1192, 1195 (1987); Nelson & Milliken, supra note 105, at 1065.
228. Nelson & Milliken, supra note 105, at 1065.

